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FISCAL COMPETITION IN SPACE AND TIME: 





Is tax competition good for economic growth? The paper addresses this question by means of 
a simple model of endogenous growth. There are many small jurisdictions in a large 
federation and individual governments benevolently maximise the welfare of immobile 
residents. Investment is costly: Quadratic installation and de-installation costs limit the 
mobility of capital. The paper looks at optimal taxation and long-run growth. In particular, the 
effects of variations in the cost parameter on economic growth and taxation are considered. It 
is shown that balanced endogenous growth paths do not always exist and effects of changes in 
installation costs are ambiguous.  
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1 The Issue 
Tax competition has been an important issue in public economics in the past two 
decades. Static models have shown that there is a tendency for underprovision of 
services provided by the public sector emerging from fiscal externalities when the 
tax base is mobile and the use of non-distorting taxes is restricted. See Wilson 
(1999) for an overview. This paper attempts to extend this literature to an economic-
growth context and poses the question whether an increase in the intensity of 
competition for a mobile tax base enhances economic growth.  
When there is competition for a mobile tax base like capital, the taxing power of 
governments is limited by the threat of capital owners to withdraw their capital if 
they consider the tax rates to be too high. Most models of tax competition assume 
that capital flight is cost-free and capital mobility therefore is perfect. Wildasin 
(2003) has shown how a dynamic formulation of an otherwise standard model of tax 
competition can be used to incorporate the more realistic case of imperfect capital 
mobility. In his model, firms face adjustment costs of the type suggested by Hayashi 
(1982) and Blanchard/ Fischer (1989, ch. 2.4) in their macroeconomic growth 
models. An instantaneous relocation of the capital stock as a response to a tax 
increase does then not occur as long as the adjustment cost function is convex. 
Instead, capital flight is a time consuming process where the speed of adjustment to 
a new steady state can be taken as a measure for capital mobility. Wildasin's article 
is concerned with an economy that approaches a static long-run equilibrium and it 
shows that the capital tax rate is positive and that it increases with increasing 
adjustment cost. The present paper, in contrast, looks at a model of endogenous 
growth where the steady state is a balanced growth path. It will be seen that not all 
results carry over from exogenous-growth to endogenous-growth models. 
Endogenous growth in this paper is sustained by the provision of public services 
to firms. We follow the approach taken by Barro (1990) and model a public sector 
that uses tax revenue to provide a flow of services to firms. Hence, we analyse an 
AK-type growth model. Mainly because public inputs are not modelled as a stock 
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variable, there are no transitional dynamics for the evolution of output and physical 
capital.
1 The set of instruments at hand of the policymaker is restricted and 
distorting taxes become desirable. In particular, capital owners cannot be taxed 
lump-sum. Thus redistribution has to be financed by distorting taxes. The central 
question will then be how the choice of tax rates is influenced by the degree of tax 
competition and how this affects growth.  
The analysis of endogenous growth in open economies has been mainly 
concerned with the issue of convergence, i.e. the question if countries tend to 
converge to a common growth rate and how this uniform growth rate is reached by 
an individual country, see for example Rebelo (1992). Another central question is 
the relationship between savings and investment. As has been shown by Turnovsky 
(1996) for a small open economy with endogenous growth, the presence of 
adjustment-costs allows for different growth rates of physical capital and financial 
assets. This is not only interesting by itself but has also consequences for taxation. In 
equilibrium, the after-tax returns of physical capital and financial assets must be 
equalized. When the interest rate earned by financial assets is exogenous to decision-
makers, this also determines the after-tax return of physical capital and the set of 
available tax policies in equilibrium is heavily constrained by the model-setup. 
Adjustment costs however drive a wedge between the rates of return of financial 
assets and physical capital such that the choice of arbitrary tax policy is possible and 
an interesting problem even in a small open economy. While our modelling of 
endogenous growth is close to Turnovsky (1996), we extend his model by 
considering the implications of tax competition for the choice of public policy as in 
Wildasin (2003). 
The literature on tax competition and growth is still rather small. A major 
complication is the fact that optimising governments use private-sector first-order 
conditions as constraints. This implies there are second derivatives in the optimality 
conditions. This problem can be solved in static models of tax competition. In 
dynamic growth models matters are often less simple. However, in some models, 
particularly those with benevolent governments and purely redistributive taxation, 
second derivatives cancel out if it is assumed that workers do not save. This is the 
modelling strategy followed in this paper. Other papers on growth and tax 
competition include Lejour/Verbon (1997), Razin/Yuen (1999) and Rauscher 
(2005). Lejour/Verbon (2005) look at a two-country model of economic growth. 
Besides the conventional fiscal externality leading to too-low taxes they identify a 
growth externality. Low taxes in one country increase the growth rate in the rest of 
the world. If this effect dominates the standard fiscal externality due to competition 
for a mobile tax base, uncoordinated taxes will be too high. This contrasts the 
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finding of the standard static tax-competition models that taxes tend to be too low. 
Razin/Yuen (1999) look at a more general model that also includes human-capital 
accumulation and endogenous population growth. They come to the conclusion that 
optimum taxes should be residence-based, capital taxes should be abolished along a 
balanced growth path, and taxes will be shifted from the mobile to the immobile 
factor of production if the source principle is applied in a world of tax-competing 
jurisdictions. Their results extend those derived by Judd (1985) and are in 
accordance with the standard economic intuition. The underlying assumption is that 
the government's set of tax instruments is large enough such that distortion-free 
taxation becomes feasible. Rauscher (2005) uses an ad-hoc model of limited inter-
jurisdictional capital mobility and comes to the conclusion that the effects of 
increased mobility are ambiguous. A central parameter in this context is the 
elasticity of intertemporal substitution, which does not only affect the magnitude of 
the economic growth rate, but also the signs of the comparative static effects.  
In the centre of our approach to model tax competition and growth are public 
inputs as the source for sustainable growth and adjustment costs causing imperfect 
mobility of capital. We consider a continuous-time infinite-horizon framework. As 
in most other models of tax competition, we look at a federation consisting of a large 
number of very small jurisdictions that have no power to affect economic variables 
determined on the federal level. In the present analysis, the only variable determined 
on the federal level will be the interest rate. Given the interest rate, governments 
choose their policies, which are then announced to the private sector. The private 
sector consists of a continuum of identical agents acting under conditions of perfect 
competition. In the first step of the analysis, individual economic agents will 
maximise utility given the interest rate and the economic policies announced by the 
government. In the next step, governments will decide about policies taking as given 
the interest rate and the first-order conditions of the private sector. Finally, the 
interest rate itself will be determined.  
The next section of this paper will present the assumptions of the model 
regarding production technology and the frictions that limit the mobility of capital. 
Sections 3 and 4 will look at the behaviour of the private sector and of the 
government, respectively. Section 5 closes the model by determining the interest 
rate and derives the central result by investigating the impact of capital mobility on 
the long-run economic-growth path. Section 6 summarises. 
   4
2   Definition of Variables and Characterisation of Technology 
Let us consider a federation consisting of a continuum of infinitely small identical 
jurisdictions, also labelled 'regions', on the unit interval. There is perfect competition 
in all markets and single jurisdictions do not have any market power vis-à-vis the 
rest of the federation. The private sector takes prices and policies announced by 
regional governments as given. Regional governments take variables determined on 
the federal level as given. As is always the case in models of tax competition, there 
is a distinction between ex ante objectives and ex post outcomes of actions taken to 
achieve the objectives. Ex ante, jurisdictions may be willing to use policy 
instruments to affect the allocation of mobile tax bases. Ex post, however, it turns 
out that all jurisdictions have acted in the same way and that the interjurisdictional 
allocation of the tax base is unaffected despite the efforts taken in the first place.  
There are three types of agents in this model: workers, entrepreneurs, who own 
physical capital and other assets, and governments. 
•  Workers are immobile across jurisdictions and inelastically supply one unit of 
labour per person in the perfectly competitive labour market of their home 
region at the current wage rate, which they take as exogenously given. 
Workers do not save and, thus, do not own physical capital or other assets. 
•  Capitalist producers own capital, hire labour, produce, save, and consume the 
unsaved share of their incomes. Saving yields an interest rate, which is 
determined on the federal capital market and which they take as exogenously 
given. If they want to transform their financial assets and invest in a particular 
jurisdiction, they face installation costs. If they want do withdraw physical 
capital, they have to bear de-installation costs. With these costs, federal 
financial assets and local physical capital are imperfectly malleable and, thus, 
capital is imperfectly mobile. 
•  Governments charge taxes and provide a productive input. They are 
benevolent and maximise the utility of immobile residents. This includes the 
possibility of income redistribution. 
As all jurisdictions are identical, let us consider a representative jurisdiction. 
There are three factors of production: capital, labour, and a publicly provided input, 
denoted K(t), L(t), and G(t), respectively, where t denotes time. For the sake of a 
simpler notation, the time argument will be omitted when this does not generate 
ambiguities. Output, Q(t), is produced by means of the three factors where marginal 
productivities are positive and declining. Moreover, we assume that the production 
function, Φ(.,.,.), is linearly homogenous in (K,G) and in (K,L). An example is the 
Cobb-Douglas function  
   ( )
α α α Φ L G K L G K Q
− = =
1 , ,  (1)   5
with 0 < α < 1. The size of the labour force is normalised to one. Each worker 
inelastically supplies one unit of labour, i.e. L=1. Thus, (1) can be rewritten 
   ( )( 1 , , , G K G K F Q ) Φ ≡ =  (1a)   
where  F(.,.) is a neoclassical constant-returns-to-scale production function 
measuring output per employee. A worker's income is the wage rate, w(t), which is 
determined on the regional labour market. Moreover, let us introduce a production 
function in intensity terms,  
   () ( ) K G g g F g f /   where , 1 ≡ ≡  (1b)   
with  f'(g)>0 and f"(g)>0, primes denoting derivatives of univariate functions. 
Regarding the marginal productivities we have  
   ' gf f FK K − = = Φ , (2a) 
   ' f FG G = = Φ , (2b) 
   ' Kgf KF F K L = − = Φ , (2c) 
where subscripts denote partial derivatives and arguments of functions have been 
omitted for convenience. 
Regarding the other two factors of production, we assume:  
•  Capital. K(t) is the quantity of a composite capital good consisting of physical 
capital, human capital, and knowledge capital. Initially, each jurisdiction is 
endowed with K(0)=K0. Capital depreciates at a constant exogenous rate m. 
Let I(t) be the rate of gross investment as a share of the capital stock. Then 
capital accumulation evolves according to  
  ,  (3)  () K m I K − = &
dots above a variable denoting its derivative with respect to time. Capital is 
mobile, albeit at a finite speed. As mentioned, there is a capital market on the 
federal level, yielding an interest rate r(t), which is exogenous to individual 
capital owners and to governments of individual jurisdictions, but 
endogenously determined by demand and supply on the federal level. Assets 
and physical capital are imperfectly malleable. Transforming financial capital 
into physical capital and vice versa is costly. We follow Wildasin (2003) in the 
specification of the installation cost function. Installation costs are defined as 
  c(Ι) K     with     c(0) = 0     and     c"(.) > 0. 
The installation cost per unit depends on the rate of investment as a share of 
capital, i.e. on the speed of gross accumulation. As c' is positive for negative 
values of I, this function also covers the possibility of de-installation costs. For 
the derivation of explicit results in the forthcoming sections of the paper we 
assume a quadratic shape of c such that   6





= ,     (4) 
i.e. c'(I)=bI and c"(I)=b, where the constant positive parameter b measures the 
barriers to mobility. b=0 represents perfect mobility and malleability. If b goes 
to infinity, capital becomes absolutely immobile. For the interpretation of 
some of the results to be derived in the following sections, it is useful to 
introduce the absolute rate of investment, J. Using I=J/K in equation (4) yields 














⎛ = .     (4') 
•  The public-sector input. The government provides a productive input at a rate 
G(t). This may be interpreted as physical infrastructure such as roads and 
ports, but also institutional infrastructure including the legal framework in 
which economic transactions take place. For the sake of simplicity, we treat 
this good as a flow variable, which is provided anew in each period. Inter-
jurisdictional spill-overs are excluded. The provision of the public input is 
financed by taxes. There are two types of fiscal instruments, a source tax on 
capital, the tax rate being θ,
2 and a redistributive lump-sum transfer going to 
the immobile factor of production. We assume that the government chooses a 
constant tax rate and allocates a constant share of the budget, 1-s, to 
redistribution. Thus,  
    K s G θ = ,    (5) 
where s > 0 (s > 1 implies lump-sum taxation of immobile residents) Equation 
(5) directly implies 
    θ s g = .     (5') 
The underlying assumption that the budget is balanced in each period seems to 
be restictive, but real-world governments are indeed subject to within-period 
budget constraints. A prominent example is the European Growth and Stability 
Pact, which restricts the policy makers' discretion to borrow. Equation (5) is a 
possibility of introducing such a restriction in a simple way. 
From equation (5'), the following result follows immediately 
Lemma 1 
All first derivatives of the production function F(.,.) are constant. 
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This follows directly from (2a) and (2b). The next section solves the optimisation 
problem faced by the private sector. Afterwards, the behaviour of the government 
will be considered.  
3 Saving, Investment and Production in the Private Sector 
As workers in this model do nothing besides inelastically supplying labour, the 
dynamics of the economy are driven by entrepreneurs and capital owners. In order to 
save on notation, we do not distinguish between these two types but assume that 
there is a homogenous group of capitalist producers. They hire labour, they save, 
and they invest. Moreover, unlike workers, capital owners are mobile and can 
choose to live where they want. If they are not satisfied with their domicile, they can 
vote with their feet like in Tiebout (1956) and move to another jurisdiction that 
offers better conditions. In contrast to the Tiebout model, mobile capitalists in our 
model do not demand local public goods. Thus, they are not willing to pay taxes to 
contribute to such goods. They will settle in the jurisdictions that tax them at the 
lowest rates. Real-world examples are Monaco and the Swiss cantons Zug, Schwyz, 
and Nidwalden, which levy very low taxes and attract millionaires from other parts 
of the country and from the rest of the world.
3 In a competitive world with many 
identical jurisdictions, there is a race to the bottom such that capitalists ultimately do 
not pay any taxes anywhere. Hence, capital income can only be taxed at source. The 
perfect mobility of capitalists has another important implication for the model. Since 
capitalists vote with their feet, they are not interested in participating in the political 
process. They do not show up at the ballot box and, thus, their interests are not taken 
into account by the policy maker.  
The representative capitalist producer has two sources of income. On the one 
hand, she retains the share of output not being paid as wages to workers. On the 
other hand she has an interest income from her stock of saved assets, A(t). There is a 
perfect asset market in the federation such that all assets yield the same rate of 
interest, r(t), to their bearers. There are two possibilities to spend the income. It can 
be consumed or it can be saved. Moreover, savings (assets) can be transformed into 
physical capital, however only at a cost, the cost function being defined by (4). The 
rate of accumulation of assets is output minus the wage payments going to workers 
minus tax payments minus consumption minus investment into physical capital 
minus costs of investing into physical capital plus interest income from assets 
accumulated in the past. In algebraic terms: 
   ( ) rA K I c IK C K wL L G K A + − − − − − = ) ( , , θ Φ & . (6) 
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Since all jurisdictions are identical, there will be no lending and borrowing ex post, 
i.e. A=0. In particular, A(0)=0. Ex ante, however, capitalists consider the possibility 
of borrowing and lending according to (6). Extreme Ponzi games are excluded, i.e. 
the present value of assets in the long run must be non-negative 




A representative capitalist producer maximises the present value of her utility. 
Utility is derived from consumption, C(t), only and is of the constant-elasticity-of-
substitution type with σ  being the rate of intertemporal substitution. The discount 
rate, δ, is positive and constant and the time horizon is infinite. Thus, the individual's 
objective is to maximise  

















C u  
subject to (3), (6), the initial endowments, K0 and A0, the tax rate θ, and the public 
expenditure, G(t), the latter two having been announced by the government. Note 
that an individual capitalist-producer does not take the government's budget 
constraint, (5), into account. The decision maker's control variables are C(t) and L(t). 
The corresponding Hamiltonian is  
   () () K m I rA K I c IK C K wL L G K C u H − ( ) + + − − − − − + = μ θ Φ λ ) ( , , ) (   
where λ(t) and μ(t) are the shadow prices, or co-state variables, of financial and 
physical capital, respectively. The canonical equations are  
   , (7a)  () λ δ λ r − = &
   () ( ) λ θ Φ μ δ μ c I I m K − − − − − + = & , (7b) 
where subscripts denote partial derivatives and ΦK will be replaced by FK in the 
remainder of the investigation. See equation (2a). Complementary slackness at 
infinity requires 
   ,   0 lim =
−




   ,   0 lim =
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and, hats above variables denoting growth rates and using (2) to substitute for  , 
these conditions imply that 
K ˆ
   , (8a)  ∞ → < + t A for ˆ ˆ δ λ
   ∞ → < − + t m I for ˆ δ μ . (8b) 
First-order conditions are 
   L w Φ = , (9a)   9
which is the standard marginal-productivity result for a competitive labour market, 
   λ = ' u , (9b) 
and 
   () λ μ ' 1 c + = . (9c) 
Condition (8a) is a standard labour-demand equation. From (9b), we can derive the 
standard Ramsey-type growth equation with C  as the growth rate of consumption  ˆ
   ( ) δ σ − = r C ˆ . (10) 
Equation (9c) states there is a wedge between the shadow prices of financial capital 
on the federation level and local physical capital. Plausibly, this wedge depends on 
the marginal cost of installation. From (9c), one can derive a condition that links the 
rates of returns in the two markets for capital. Taking time derivatives of the shadow 
prices, inserting (7a) and (7b), and using (9c) again to eliminate λ/μ , we have 
   () ( ) ( ) () ' ' 1
"
1
c m I c m F r c
c
I K − − − − − − + = θ & . (11) 
The condition for a steady state, i.e. for  , is  0 = I &
   ( ) ( ) r c c m I c m FK ' 1 ' + = − + − − − θ . (12) 
This is a capital-market indifference condition. On the right-hand side, we have 
the interest rate augmented by a term that contains the marginal mobility cost. If the 
marginal productivity of capital in the jurisdiction under consideration equals 
(1+c')r, an investor is indifferent whether or not to install an additional marginal unit 
of capital in this jurisdiction. On the left-hand side, we have the marginal 
productivity of capital, net of taxes and other costs to be borne by the investor. The 
first term is the gross productivity from which the rate of depreciation and the tax 
rate are subtracted. Without mobility cost, this would constitute the net productivity 
of capital after taxes. With mobility cost, two additional terms emerge. The first one 
is c. Mobility costs are proportional to capital, i.e. cK. Thus, additional capital raises 
installation costs. The final term on the left-hand side may be interpreted as an inter-
temporal benefit from a larger capital stock. If I>m, the capital stock grows and this 
implies lower future installation costs per unit of newly installed capital, J. See 
equation (4').  
In the derivation of the optimal rate of investment, we follow Turnovsky (1996). 
Using the quadratic shape of the investment cost function, (4), we can rewrite (11) 
such that 





⎛ − − − − + + − = r m F
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Figure 1: Investment Dynamics 
 
This is a quadratic differential equation that can be represented as a hump-shaped 
curve in a phase diagram with a stable and an unstable equilibrium. See Figure 1. 
The condition for a steady state with   is  0 = I &
   ()() r m F
b
m r m r I K − − − − + ± + = θ
2 2
2 , 1 , (13) 
where the smaller value, I1, corresponds to the unstable equilibrium in Figure 1 and 
the larger one, I2, to the stable equilibrium. An imaginary solution would imply a 
fluctuating path of capital accumulation. One can show that I2 as well as an 
imaginary solution would violate the transversality condition.
4 Noting that I1 is an 
instable solution of (11'), it follows that there are no transitional dynamics. This 
implies 
Proposition 1 
The optimal rate of investment is constant along the optimal trajectory, 
with 
  ()() r m F
b
m r m r I K − − − − + − + = θ
2 2
1 . (13') 
Imaginary solutions are excluded.  
                                                 
4    Note that I is constant in the steady state. Thus (8c) implies  . Using this in (7b) 
yields the condition that I1<r+m. This is violated by I2 and by any imaginary solution to 
(13) because its real part would be r+m. 
λ μ ˆ ˆ =  11
Constancy follows from Lemma 1, which states that FK is constant. Condition (13') 
shows that the optimum rate of investment, as expected, is increasing in the marginal 
productivity of capital and decreasing in the depreciation rate, the interest rate, and 
the cost parameter b. It should be noted that the marginal productivity of capital is 
determined by g via (2a) and that, ex post, g is determined by (5'). Thus FK depends 
on the tax rate as well. Moreover we have 
Finally, to fully characterise the savings behaviour of the private sector, the initial 
level of consumption needs to be determined. Using (1a), (9a), (2c), (3), (4), and 
(10) in (6) yields 
  
() () rA e C e K I
b
I F A
t r t m I





⎛ − − − =
− − δ σ θ ) 0 ( ) 0 (
2
1 2
1 1 & .  
In an intertemporal steady-state equilibrium with identical jurisdictions, there is no 
lending and borrowing, i.e.   for all t. This implies equal growth rates of 
the capital stock and of consumption, 
A A & = = 0
   () δ σ − = − r m I1 , (14) 
and the starting value of C is: 




1 1 K I
b





⎛ − − − = θ . (15) 
Equation (14) determines, together with (13'), the equilibrium interest rate as an 
implicit function of the parameters of the model and of the tax rate. Equation (15) 
states that consumption is positively related to initial capital endowment and capital 
productivity and negatively related to the tax rate, the rate of investment, and the 
installation cost. 
 
4. Government Behaviour and Taxation 
The government maximises the welfare of immobile residents. Immobile residents 
are workers. Their wage rate is gf'K and their transfer income (1–s)θK. See 
equations (9a), (2c), and (5). The government takes the interest rate as exogenously 
given. In particular, it does not consider condition (14), which determines the 
equilibrium interest rate when, ex post, all governments have chosen the same tax 
policies. Let us assume that workers have the same preference parameters as the 
capitalists. Thus, the government's objective is to maximise 
   () () () []
dt

















− − ∞ − ∫ . (16)   12
We impose a limit on taxation. The maximum to be charged from capitalist 
producers is their period income, i.e. output minus wage payments. Using (2c), we 
have 
   K F < θ . (17) 
The condition for the objective function, (16), to be finite is 
  () 0 1 1 > + − = − + σδ σ r I m r ,  (18) 
and it is assumed for the remanider ofthe investigation that the parameters of the 
model are such that the condition is satisfied.
5 Note this is the same condition as that 
derived from complementary slackness at infinity for the private sector. See 
Footnote 4. 
Maximising (16) with respect to the government's policy parameters, θ  and s, 
and subject to (17) yields. 
Proposition 2 
The optimal tax-and-expenditure policy of the government in the equilibrium 
is characterised by 
  ,  (19a)  1 '= f
  ( )
2
1 I m r b − + = θ   (19b) 





m r I m r
m r F
b ≤
+ + − +
− −




,  (19c) 
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m r I m r
m r
b =
+ − − +
+
= θ .  (19d) 
where  () σδ σ + − = − + r I m r 1 1  can be used to eliminate I1. 
For the derivation of these results, see the appendix. Conditions (19a-d) can be 
interpreted as follows. 
•  Equation (19a) states that the marginal productivity of government 
expenditure is unity. This is a standard result in tax-competition models with 
lump-sum tax instruments. See, e.g., Zodrow/Mieszkowski (1986, p. 363). The 
underlying intuition to explain this result in our model is the following one. In 
a first step, capital is taxed and the tax revenue is added to labour income. Out 
of this gross income, workers pay a lump-sum tax that is used to finance the 
                                                 
5   Condition (18) follows from noting that the growth rate of the integrand is 
−δ + 1−
1
σ () I1 − m ( ( ) ). This growth rate must be negative. Using (14) to substitute for σ 
and I1, respectively, one obtains (18).   13
publicly provided good. Thus, the cost of producing one unit of G is exactly 
one unit of GDP. Since f'=ΦG is the marginal productivity of G, f'=1 is nothing 
else but the rule that the marginal productivity of a factor should equal the 
marginal cost of employing it. 
•  Equation (19b) determines the optimum tax rate. It is non-negative: capital 
subsidies are not feasible.
6 Ceteris paribus, the larger b, the larger is θ in 
(19b). For a given interest rate, the government of a jurisdiction chooses the 
tax rate such that it goes to infinity as investment costs become prohibitive. 
The reasoning behind this is intuitive: as de-installation of capital becomes 
more costly, the possibility to evade taxes shrinks and the government can 





Figure 2: Equilibrium interest rate and capital mobility 
for unconstrained θ 
 
•  Equation (19c) determines the interest rate in the growth equilibrium with an 
unconstrained optimal tax. The appendix explores the properties of (19c). 
They are depicted in Figure 2. It is seen that r < FK – m if installation costs are 
positive. Moreover it is seen that an equilibrium interest rate does not exist if b 
is above a certain threshold value which is the maximum of the b(r) function. 
The reason is that for large values of b a small country's government would 
choose an extensively high tax rate. The underlying reason is the small-
                                                 
6   θ does not depend on the lump-sum tax rate, τ . This is due to the fact that f'=1 has been 
used in the derivation of (18b). If there is a restriction on lump-sum taxation, f'=1 cannot 
be used and (18b) is changed to (A8) in the appendix and then θ  does depend on τ.    14
country assumption. An indvidual government neglects the impact of its tax 
policy on the interest rate. If all countries do this, the asset market equilibrium 
collapses. A sensible threshold on the tax rate is (17) and its impact will be 
discussed in due course.  so large that since it does not consider its impact on 
the interest rate. The upward-sloping part of the r(b) curve left of the 
maximum indicates the possibility of multiple growth equilibria. For each b, 
there are two values of r satisfying condition (19c). However, the lower of the 
two values of r is irrelevant here.
7) The maximum of the b(r) function  is 
attained for the following value of r: 
  () ()
1
2 2










K . (20) 
This follows from setting dr/db=0 in equation (A7).
8 Moreover, one can show 
that the tax rate in this point may be larger or less than the dritical value, FK. 
See the Appendix.  
 
•  Equation (19d) determines the interest rate in the growth equilibrium if the tax 
constraint is binding. The appendix derives the properties of (19d). The 
solution of (19d) is depicted in Figure 3. It is seen that I1<r+m and that I1 is 
not defined within the interval  – m – b/2 < r < – m.  The two bending lines 
depict the I1(r) function outside this interval. I1 is always negative because the 
tax rate θ=FK reduces the income accruing to capitalist-producers to zero. In 
order to satisfy some consumption needs, they have to dis-invest and consume 
the capital stock. Since dis-investement is costly, they do this slowly and the 
rate of dis-investment is finite. The upward-sloping straight line is the 
equilibrium condition, I1=m+σ(r-δ). See equation (14). In the case shown in 
Figure 3, this line intersects the I1(r) line, possibly twice. However, only the 
right-hand part of the I1(r) curve is relevant here. Note that equilibria do not 
always exist. If m is large and σ is small, the capital-market equilibrium line 
has an intercept close to m and is so flat that there are no points of intersetion 
with the I1(r) line. The underlying intuition is that capital owners want to 
withdraw their capital at rate that is incompatible with low discounting and 
low intertemporal substitution in consumption. Finally Figure 3 shows a shift 
in the I1(r) line generated by an increase in b. With higher b, dis-investment 
becomes more costly, thus, the rate of investment becomes less negative, and 
                                                 
7   Assume that b has attained its maximum on the b(r) curve. There is a unique equilibrium 
with a well-defined r. Now let us reduce b by a small amount. Each government, taking 
the interest rate and the other parameters of the model as given, will reduce the tax rate θ  
slightly. This has a positive effect on the interest rate. Thus, the part of the b(r) curve to 
the right of  the maximum is relevant here 
8   The proof is available from the authors on request.   15
the interest rate rises. In the extreme, b→∞ and I1 approaches zero. Then   
r → δ  – m/σ . Capital-owners cannot save their assets from taxation by dis-






Figure 3: Investment rate, interest rate, 
and capital mobility for θ=FK 
-m  -m-b/2 
I1  I1=r+m  
  
Figure 4 combines Figures 2 and 3 and shows the impact of changes in b on the 
equilibrium interest rate. For the θ=FK case, we have  r → – m  for  b → 0  from 
(18d),  r → δ – m/σ  for  b → ∞  and r being increasing in b in between. Moreover, 




















K ,   
which follows from equating (19c) and (19d). This is a cubic equation showing that 
multiple equilibria are possible. In Figure 4 the solid line repesents the un-
constrained equilibrium and the dotted line represents the equilibrium constrained by 
θ=FK. Note that the unconstrained curve is shifted horizontally by changes in FK 
whereas the other curve is unaffected by such a change. This implies that the point 
of intersection can be located in the increasing or in the decreasing segment of the 
solid line. Figure 4a shows the former case, Figure 4b the latter case. The arrows 
depict the effect of an increase in b, starting from zero at r=FK–m. The interest rate 
is reduced initially. If the constraint is met, there is a discret change in the interest   16
rate. Afterwards the interest rate rises since the rate of dis-investment is declining 
with increasing de-installation cost. 
– m  δ–m/σ  FK–m 
b 




– m  δ–m/σ  FK–m 
b 
Figure 4b: The impact of b on r 
r 
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The final question to be asked is related to the impact of installation cost on the tax 
rate. Does higher capital mobility lead to lower taxes? Differentiation of (19b) with 
respect to b yields 











⎛ − + − + − + =
dr
db






where dr/db is taken from (A7) in the appendix. Since db/dr goes to zero close to 
the maximum of the b(r) function, the second term on the right-hand side can 
dominate the first term, which is unambiguously positive. The sign of the second 
term is, however, indeterminate. Note that the second term vanishes for σ=1. In this 
case, θ=bδ
 2 and the tax rate is linear in b.  
Since neither θ can be expressed explicitly as a function of b nor (21) can be 
solved to yield the shape of θ(b), we did some simulations using the parameters 
Fk=0.15, m=0.05, and δ=0.03 and different values of σ. The results are shown in 
Figure 5. It what has been conjectured earlier: non-monotonous behaviour of taxes 
in response to changes in capital mobility is possible.  
 
Figure 5: θ(b) for different values of σ 
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5. Final Remarks 
The paper has addressed tax competition in a general-equilibrium endogenous 
growth model. It has been shown that 
1.  An equilibrium does not always exist. If installation costs and capital 
depreciation are large and the rate of discount and the elasticity of 
intertemporal substitution are small, an equilibrium does not exist since the 
tax rate becomes very high and capitalists want to reduce their capital stock 
at a rate that is incompatible with the smooth consumtion path implied by the 
low rate of discount and the small elasticity of intertemporal substitution 
2.  The impact of installation cost on the capital tax rate is ambiguous.  
It is seen that the results of our endogneous-growth model differ substantially from 
those derived by Wildasin (2003) for a growth model that approaches a no-growth 
staedy state in the long run. 
Future research could aim at comparing tax competition to a coordinated tax 
policy. Given the algebraic complexities of the model, we conjecture that this will 
be possible only for specific assumptions about the parameters of the model, e.g. 
using a logarithmic utility function, which restricts the elasticity of intertemporal 
substitution to unity. 
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Appendix 
Derivation of (19a). Assuming that the integral in (16) is finite, the growth rate of 
the integrand must be negative. Then the integral can be rewritten: 
   () () []
























Taking first derivatives with respect to s and θ and noting that g=σθ  (equation (5')), 
we have 

























































































Combining (A1) and (A2) yields 





















Note that  
  
















1  (A4) 
and  
  













1 , (A5) 
where (2a) has been used to substitute for FK in the numerator. Using (A4) and (A5) 
in (A3) yields 
   ()
() 1 "
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f gf θ θ
. (A6) 
Simple calculus then leads to  f'=1. Thus, condition (18a) has been derived.  
Derivation of (19b). Use (14) to substitute for the square-root term in (A5). Using 
the result and (14), the latter to substitute for I1, in (A2) gives 
   () () ( )
() ()
2 1
1 " ) 1 ( '
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From f'=1 and g=sθ, (18b) follows immediately. The second part of (18b) follows 
from (14). 
Derivation of (19c). Take squares on both sides of (13') and use (18b) substitute for 
θ. Then, rearranging terms yields (18d).  
Properties of (19c). From (18c), we have 
   0 = ⇔ − = b m F r K ,     0 > ⇔ − < b m F r K      
   0 − → ⇒ +∞ → b r  ,      0 + → ⇒ −∞ → b r  
Taking the derivative in (18c), noting that dI1/dr=σ  yields  
  () ( ) ( )( )( ) [ ]





m r I m r
m r I m r r m F m r I m r
dr
db K
+ + − +
+ + − + − − − + + + − +
− =
σ
  (A7) 
For db/dr=0, we get a quadratic equation in r, which implies that the b(r) function 
has two extrema, a maximum for r < FK – m  and a minimum for r > FK – m. 
Values of θ in the maximum of the b(r) function. It is shown by two examples that 
θ can be larger or less than FK. To illustrate the first possibility, assume that σ=1. 
Then (20) changes to 
 
2 2 δ + − − = K K F m F r .  
Using this in (19c) and inserting into (19b) yields 
 













From the fact that the denominator is less than δ
 2, it follows that θ>FK. The opposite 
case can be shown for an example, where the parameters of the model are such that 
the second term in the numerator in the square root in (20) vanishes, i.e. 
() σ σ δ / ) 1 ( m FK − − − = , which is possible for large values of σ  even if FK–m > 0. 
Then,  
  ( () ) m F r K − − + − =
−2 2 ) 1 ( 1 1 σ  
and the tax rate turns out to be (to be completed) 
 










+ + − + = .  (A8) 
Taking squares and solving for b, one obtains (19d).  
Properties of (19d). The argument of the square-root in (A8) is negative if  – m – 
b/2 < r < – m. Then there is no real-valued solution to (A8). On the boundaries of 
this interval, I1 = r+m. Outside this interval, I1 < r+m. Closer inspection of (A8), 
using de l'Hospital's rule, yields that I1 goes to – ∞ if r goes to ± ∞. Differentiation 


















− = .  (A9) 
This derivative explains the shape of the I1(r) curve in Figure 3. CESifo Working Paper Series 
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